European 5G Networks Remained Reliant on Chinese Hardware
A new report highlights widespread reliance on Chinese equipment in critical European and UK telecommunications infrastructure.
Updated on Oct. 2, 2026 in Telecommunications
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Research published in October 2026 revealed that European nations and the UK lack consistent criteria for identifying high-risk technology suppliers, despite significant integration of equipment from vendors like Huawei and ZTE. Governments often lack complete visibility into the specific components operating within their national 5G networks.
Why it matters
The lack of agreement on what constitutes a high-risk information and communications technology supplier has resulted in a fragmented regulatory landscape. This ambiguity complicates efforts to secure critical infrastructure as nations continue to rely on diverse vendor ecosystems.
Germany's 5G network currently utilizes Chinese hardware for nearly 60% of its radio access components. In Spain, which awarded a €12m contract to Huawei for OceanStor cloud storage servers, these systems have been used to store sensitive judicial wiretap recordings.
The players
Huawei
A global telecommunications and cloud infrastructure provider that supplies 5G radio access equipment and server solutions to European markets.
ZTE
A multinational telecommunications hardware company that manufactures network equipment integrated into various international 5G infrastructure projects.
MI5
The United Kingdom's intelligence agency responsible for protecting national security, including monitoring threats to sensitive research and infrastructure.
Rusi
A defense and security think tank that provides analysis on geopolitical risks and critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.
The details
The report indicates that European infrastructure relies on a patchwork approach to risk assessment, often without basic documentation of specific equipment inventory. Huawei OceanStor servers, which use distributed storage architectures to manage high-density data, were explicitly cited as hosting sensitive judicial communications in Spain, highlighting potential risks where data handling infrastructure intersects with foreign-supplied hardware.
Timeline
October 2026: Rusi published its report detailing Chinese technology risks in European infrastructure.
2025: US lawmakers raised concerns regarding the use of Spanish Huawei data storage systems.
The Tech Race
This analysis marks a significant update in the ongoing geopolitical effort to decouple critical digital infrastructure from specific foreign suppliers. It follows the pattern set by UK intelligence agency MI5 warnings regarding front companies and sensitive university research, extending those concerns to the physical hardware layer of 5G networks.
Current infrastructure dependencies mean that critical services and sensitive government data are processed on hardware from foreign vendors. Future regulatory shifts could force network operators to replace existing equipment, potentially impacting service costs and regional network deployment timelines.
The takeaway
The report highlights the urgent need for standardized risk protocols across European borders as nations attempt to balance network performance with national security. Observers should track upcoming legislative sessions in Germany and Spain for potential mandates on hardware auditing or vendor replacement schedules.
Further reading
For broader context on current network security debates, visit Telecommunications.
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Do you trust that foreign-owned technology used in your nation's critical infrastructure is secure?
