Ten Trans-Pacific Cables Identified as High-Risk Assets
A new index highlights the vulnerability of critical subsea infrastructure to state-sponsored maritime gray zone tactics.
Updated on Oct. 28, 2026 in Data Centers

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A September 2026 report from the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission highlights the vulnerability of trans-Pacific subsea cables to geopolitical interference. The assessment identifies 10 high-risk cable projects, including those owned by Google, Meta, and Verizon, as potential targets for gray zone sabotage.
Why it matters
As global data traffic increasingly relies on these physical conduits, identifying and securing high-risk infrastructure has become a priority for maintaining network stability. These findings underscore the vulnerability of critical data pathways to state-sponsored maritime activities.
The study analyzed movement patterns of 200 research ships, finding that Chinese vessels spent more time near undersea infrastructure than those of other nations between 2020 and 2025. It also cited 500 incidents of Russian boats maneuvering near UK cables as a precedent for gray zone tactics.
The players
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission
A congressional commission that investigates and reports on the national security implications of the economic relationship between the US and China.
Center for Strategic and International Studies
A defense and security think tank that tracks global maritime activities and military research vessel movements.
A global technology company that manages extensive subsea infrastructure, including the TPU project cable.
Meta
A social technology conglomerate that operates large-scale subsea network assets such as the ORCA cable.
The details
The report utilizes a Trans-Pacific Cable Gray Zone Vulnerability Index to rank cables based on water depth, regional shipping traffic, and territorial claims. Researchers evaluated infrastructure like the Meta ORCA cable and Google TPU project by overlaying ship tracking data with undersea map locations. This methodology exposes how standard research vessel activity can mask maneuvers designed to survey or potentially disable physical network components.
Timeline
Between 2020 and 2025, Chinese research ships surveyed areas near critical undersea cables.
In 2025, a Taiwanese court sentenced a captain to three years in prison for damaging the Tai-Peng 3 cable.
In September 2026, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission published the vulnerability report.
In October 2026, the CSIS released a report documenting Chinese research vessel patterns.
The Tech Race
This vulnerability assessment follows the 2025 conviction of a Chinese captain for damaging the Tai-Peng 3 cable, which signaled a shift in how these incidents are legally handled. The report marks a departure from treating cable damage as accidental, instead categorizing such events as part of a deliberate gray zone tactic.
Data throughput for international services may face increased latency if simultaneous damage forces traffic onto backup or slower routes. While no immediate outages are scheduled, the vulnerability index suggests that regional network architecture may undergo future re-routing.
The takeaway
The security of the global internet's physical layer is increasingly dependent on monitoring maritime gray zone maneuvers. Observers should track upcoming international policy discussions regarding the protection of undersea infrastructure in contested waters.
Further reading
For more on the physical security of network pathways, explore the latest research in Data Centers.
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